Energy-aware Demand Selection and Allocation for Real-time IoT Data
  Trading by Gupta, Pooja et al.
Energy-aware Demand Selection and Allocation for
Real-time IoT Data Trading
Pooja Gupta
School of Computer Science and Engineering
The University of New South Wales
Sydney, Australia
pooja.gupta@unsw.edu.au
Volkan Dedeoglu
Data61, CSIRO
Brisbane, Australia
volkan.dedeoglu@csiro.au
Kamran Najeebullah
Data61, CSIRO
Brisbane, Australia
kamran.najeebullah@csiro.au
Salil S. Kanhere
School of Computer Science and Engineering
The University of New South Wales
Sydney, Australia
salil.kanhere@unsw.edu.au
Raja Jurdak
School of Computer Science
Queensland University of Technology
Brisbane, Australia
r.jurdak@qut.edu.au
Abstract—Personal IoT data is a new economic asset that
individuals can trade to generate revenue on the emerging data
marketplaces. Typically, marketplaces are centralized systems
that raise concerns of privacy, single point of failure, little
transparency and involve trusted intermediaries to be fair.
Furthermore, the battery-operated IoT devices limit the amount
of IoT data to be traded in real-time that affects buyer/seller
satisfaction and hence, impacting the sustainability and usability
of such a marketplace. This work proposes to utilize blockchain
technology to realize a trusted and transparent decentralized
marketplace for contract compliance for trading IoT data streams
generated by battery-operated IoT devices in real-time. The
contribution of this paper is two-fold: (1) we propose an au-
tonomous blockchain-based marketplace equipped with essential
functionalities such as agreement framework, pricing model and
rating mechanism to create an effective marketplace framework
without involving a mediator, (2) we propose a mechanism
for selection and allocation of buyers’ demands on seller’s
devices under quality and battery constraints. We present a
proof-of-concept implementation in Ethereum to demonstrate
the feasibility of the framework. We investigated the impact of
buyer’s demand on the battery drainage of the IoT devices under
different scenarios through extensive simulations. Our results
show that this approach is viable and benefits the seller and
buyer for creating a sustainable marketplace model for trading
IoT data in real-time from battery-powered IoT devices.
Index Terms—Blockchain, smart contract, optimization,
battery-operated, data marketplace, IoT
I. INTRODUCTION
Personal IoT devices generate an overwhelming amount of
sensing data, which could be utilized for solving real-time
problems within smart cities, transportation, and waste man-
agement. However, this data is usually accumulated in private
silos that are difficult to access and remain under-utilized due
to the lack of incentives and data sharing mechanisms. Given
the potential value of this data, the notion of a data marketplace
has been proposed, which facilitates the trade between data
owners and potential buyers.
Conventional centralized approaches based on the client-
server model [1], [2], are built around a trusted third party
that conducts all management operations and controls every
aspect of a trade. Hence, raising issues such as single point of
failure, lack of scalability, the need for expensive infrastructure
and limited privacy. Recently, decentralized data marketplaces
based on blockchain technology [3] have gained popularity
due to the technology’s salient features including transparency,
security, anonymity and immutability. Blockchain has the
potential to overcome the aforementioned problems by dis-
tributing the computation across multiple nodes. It provides a
verifiable and auditable ledger by recording all transactions,
ensures integrity and trust in every transaction using the
consensus mechanism and facilitates owner-controlled access
and data sharing.
Existing data marketplace approaches that use blockchain
provide specific functionalities. For instance, in [4], the
blockchain platform provides access control policies that en-
able data owners to manage who can access their data and
for how long. In [5], blockchain is used as a distributed
data catalogue for listing details of offerings in a reliable
and immutable manner. Although these approaches allow the
sharing of IoT data, they do not have all the essential functions
of a marketplace. A functional and effective marketplace
must support all the buying/selling activities such as listing
and discovering data, managing contracts, pricing, billing and
reputation mechanisms for entities to rate each other.
Furthermore, participants’ economic utility is an essential
consideration for usability and wider adoption of the market-
place. Existing work focusing on economic aspects adopted
incentive mechanisms based on pricing [6], [7]. These pricing
strategies can motivate users to contribute their data. However,
to guarantee the long-term engagement of participants, an
economic model is required that analyzes the trade-off between
maximizing the seller’s and the buyer’s utility.
The utility of a seller depends on the revenue generated
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from data trading while that of the buyer depends on getting
quality data for the desired rate and duration. However, IoT
devices are restricted in their capabilities and derive their
energy from batteries or external sources using harvesters.
Recharging or using harvesting techniques can prolong the
battery lifetime. However, typically, the available energy is
insufficient to stream data continuously to multiple buyers in
real-time, impacting seller’s and buyer’s utility. For instance,
consider an application developer providing location-based
services by purchasing real-time location data from multiple
sellers. The developer specifies his desired data quality in
terms of accuracy and latency, sampling interval, and duration.
These parameters directly impact the battery consumption
of the seller’s device. Existing techniques [8] for improving
power consumption of IoT devices usually compromise data
quality for energy efficiency. High-quality data(high accuracy
and frequency, low latency) usually consumes more energy.
For instance, the positioning approach which provides the most
accurate location information (GPS: 6m, Assisted GPS: 60m,
Cell-ID/Wifi Positioning System: 1600m), consumes the most
power (GPS: high, AGPS: medium, Cell-ID/WPS: low) [9].
Similarly, when an IoT sensor works at a low sampling
interval and for a longer duration, it imposes a heavy work-
load on different components (processor, network, storage
and sensors) of the device, draining the battery rapidly. As
an example, if a smartphone owner sells his location data
by sending frequent (low sampling interval) data, the phone
battery depletes more quickly. This degrades the smartphone
user experience and impacts other buyers’ utility with whom
the seller has already made an agreement. On the other
hand, if a low data rate setting is applied, the data quality
is reduced, degrading the buyer’s utility. Due to the costs
associated with continuously sensing and transmitting data,
a seller has to make an optimal decision to serve buyers’
demands in real-time based on the devices’ current residual
energy and capabilities. Thus, it is vital to find a solution
that maximizes the participants’ utilities while considering the
limited capabilities and constraints for creating a sustainable
marketplace.
This work follows on from our earlier proposal for an
IoT data marketplace, where we presented a 3-tier archi-
tectural design. The approach suggested in [10] was based
on a distributed P2P broker for providing discovery and
matching functionalities. Additionally, data subscription and
register smart contracts were collectively used to automate
data trading. This paper presents an enhancement of our
prior marketplace design that addresses the two challenges
mentioned above: (i) satisfying the seller’s and buyer’s utilities
when trading real-time sensing data from battery-operated IoT
devices, and (ii) offering key mechanisms for a marketplace,
i.e., agreement management, pricing model, and reputation
mechanism. We realize these functionalities leveraging smart
contracts to record agreement details, participant’s ratings and
data prices in blockchain in a transparent, secure, efficient
and automated way without involving any mediator. Our paper
makes the following contributions:
• We present details of the blockchain-enabled framework
including the architectural design, the participants, and their
interactions.
• We formulate the demand selection and allocation optimiza-
tion problem to maximize the seller’s revenue by taking into
account the resource-constrained nature of IoT devices and
solve it using our novel greedy heuristic algorithm. Simulation
results confirm that both sellers and buyers will benefit from
the proposed algorithm.
• We implement key components of the marketplace such as
agreement framework, pricing model and rating model using
smart contracts and present a proof-of-concept implementation
of our framework in Ethereum testnet to demonstrate its
feasibility.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we survey the related research. Section III presents an
overview of the marketplace. In Section IV, we present integer
linear formulation of the optimization problem followed by the
details of our smart contracts in Section V. Proof of concept
implementation and evaluations are presented in Section VI,
and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss existing works which can be
broadly categorized into two groups: task allocation optimiza-
tion and blockchain-based data marketplace frameworks.
Task allocation optimization - Demand selection and alloca-
tion are essential for reducing IoT device energy consumption
and increasing seller’s revenue generation. [11] presents a
mixed-integer linear programming formulation of assigning
services to multiple heterogeneous network interfaces in an
IoT device. The problem aims to minimize the total cost of
utilizing the interfaces’ resources while satisfying all the ser-
vices’ requirements in contrast to our case of selecting a subset
of demands. In [12], the authors maximize the profit with
consideration of the task’s urgency based on execution time
deadline and QoS constraints to efficiently allocate resources
and reduce the penalty cost due to agreement violations.
However, we aim to select and allocate demands which require
completion of the demand without any disruption irrespective
of the execution time deadline. [13] presents a systematic liter-
ature review of various resource allocation methods in the IoT
context. It concludes that collaboration of resource modeling,
allocation, and monitoring is necessary to enable proper and
continuous operation of IoT resources. We considered these
guidelines while designing our framework.
Blockchain-based marketplace - Table I compares the re-
cent blockchain-based marketplace frameworks to identify the
supported functionalities with respect to real-time IoT data
trading. The main criteria for our comparison are the smart
contract application in realizing marketplace functions, data
transfer method, real-time support, discovery and selection
mechanism, pricing model, data agreement, and rating model.
Through this comparison, we demonstrate the need for a
holistic and effective marketplace design equipped with these
key marketplace functionalities. Our framework supports (i)
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF BLOCKCHAIN BASED MARKETPLACE SOLUTIONS
Elements [4] [14] [5] [15] [16] [17] [18]
Smart contract
application
Access control Access control Data offering,
receipt
Registration,
data offering
Data offering Access control Access control,
data integrity
Data transfer Broker P2P MQTT Swarm SDPP [19] MQTT pub-sub
Real-time sup-
port
Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Select & match No DHT browse
blockchain
browse
blockchain
browse
blockchain
No No
Pricing model No No No No No No No
Data
Agreement
No No Yes No No No No
Rating model No No No Rate quality of
the data
Rate quality of
the data
No Rate quality of
the data
selection and matching based on available battery in devices
to maximize seller’s and buyer’s utilities, (ii) the formation
of customized and flexible agreement based on users’ spec-
ifications, (iii) dynamic data pricing to encourage a seller
to provide high-quality data, (iv) tuning of reputation scores
based on the malicious behavior of dishonest actors and (v)
data transfer over secured a TCP connection.
III. OVERVIEW OF MARKETPLACE
In this section, we present the blockchain-enabled frame-
work for trading IoT data in real-time in an autonomous and
decentralized manner, the main actors and their roles, and the
high-level interactions to facilitate data trading.
A. Real-time IoT data marketplace
Our IoT data trading framework has four layers: physical,
blockchain, off-chain and application stacked as shown in
Figure 1. Due to space limitations, some of the technical
implementation details are omitted. We assume that the seller
has at least one computationally capable device to host this
framework, which will serve as the gateway for other resource-
constrained devices that together form the physical layer.
Fig. 1. Multi-layered Blockchain Framework.
The physical layer consists of all the battery-operated IoT
devices such as sensors, drones, smartphones, watches, etc.
As per the buyers’ requirements, the sensors acquire data and
transfer them to the gateway periodically.
The off-chain layer performs activities that are not recorded
on the blockchain. We assume that following are some of the
critical components needed for resource-constrained devices:
(a) The battery monitoring entity periodically polls the devices
to get the current battery status which plays an important role
in device allocation to demands.
(b) The demand selection component selects and allocates
received demands to the seller’s devices, while satisfying
the buyers’ requirements and maximizing the seller’s revenue
using an optimization module explained in Section IV.
(c) The negotiation component uses Contract Net Protocol [20]
for negotiating the terms between seller and buyer until an
agreement is reached
(d) The transmission and metering component performs the
data transfer via a secure TCP connection established be-
tween the buyer and the gateway device. The metering sub-
component maintains the count of the transferred data samples
used in the settlement.
At the blockchain layer, we utilize four smart contracts
(namely: data subscription, register, pricing, and rating con-
tracts) to facilitate the essential functionalities of the market-
place. The write transactions invoke these smart contracts at
different stages of the data trading process either from the off-
chain or the application components. Register and data sub-
scription contracts collectively provide an agreement frame-
work to ensure the integrity of an agreement, non-repudiation
of the owners and guarantee that the participants’ behaviors
automatically conform to the terms of the agreements. The
pricing contract supports a competition-based price model to
assess the price of the IoT data based on market dynamics.
The rating contract records the trading history and uses it to
evaluate the reputation score of the actors and adds safeguards
by tuning reputation scores based on malicious behaviors
such as collusion, false feedback, contract violations, etc. The
details of the smart contracts, their methods and associated
transactions are given in Section V.
Fig. 2. High-level interactions of actors in marketplace
B. Actors and their roles
Our model involves three rational actors with specific roles
linked to their participation in the data marketplace.
• Seller - A seller uses two strategies to generate a sustain-
able income: (1) maximizing revenue by using the available
resources on IoT devices as efficiently as possible, and (2)
attracting buyers by offering add-on features such as high-
quality IoT data or sensitive data which are distorting, re-
vealing or intruding data owner’s privacy. The seller posts the
offerings to the facilitator as metadata. The metadata consists
of information such as a public identifier (i.e., changeable
public key) to anonymize the identity of the seller, list of
IoT devices owned, geographical co-ordinates associated with
the sensing data, temporal context of the data which can
be static or dynamic and data usage license which defines
the appropriate use of the data and also includes terms for
restrictions of reselling of the data. In this work, we do
not address the problem associated with reselling the data
by unauthorized agents. Digital watermarking techniques [21]
could be used to solve this problem.
• Buyer - The buyer’s requirements are classified into context-
based requirements such as data type, location, temporal
context, and seller’s rating and quantitative-based requirements
such as data quality, sampling interval and duration. The
difference between the two is that the latter is dependent on
the battery availability of the seller’s devices while the former
is independent of available battery.
• Facilitator - To address the scalability issue, we leverage
geographically distributed facilitators that are interconnected
in a P2P network and form an overlay network spanning the
entire globe. Each facilitator is expected to oversee a particular
service area/geographic region. We assume that the facilitator
is a trusted and highly resourced entity whose motivation is
to receive incentives in return for its service. All the sellers
and buyers must register with a facilitator nearest to their
geographical location and create a profile.
C. High-level interactions
The end-to-end interactions among the actors are illustrated
in Figure 2. First, a facilitator receives queries and offerings
from registered buyers and sellers respectively. Next, the
facilitator performs semantic matching between offerings and
queries using ontological models [22] and creates a list of
potentially matching buyers and sends it to all identified
sellers. The seller on receiving the potential list of buyers’
demands uses optimization, as explained in section IV, to
identify desirable buyers whose queries can be satisfied based
on the battery availability of his devices. Next, he sends the
data offerings directly to the desired buyers, followed by
an optional negotiation process. Finally, the different stages
of trading such as agreement formation, settlement, etc. are
performed using smart contracts. Data is transferred off-chain
over a secured TCP connection to buyers.
IV. DEMAND SELECTION AND ALLOCATION MECHANISM
The selection of demands discussed in Section III involves
two steps. First, the facilitator performs the matching and
selection based on the buyer’s contextual requirements. Note
that, quantitative-based requirements depend on the battery
availability, a fast-changing factor, of the seller’s device. To
avoid network overheads associated with the seller updating
the facilitator with the current battery level of his devices,
a facilitator performs matching based only on the context-
based requirements. Second, the selection is made based on
the quantitative requirements at the seller end. The demand
selection component of the off-chain layer performs this task
intending to maximize the seller’s revenue and meet the quality
requirements and ensure completion of the selected demands
without any interruptions. This mechanism of energy-aware
demand selection and allocation is referred to as EDSA.
In this section, we formally state the EDSA problem. Given
a set of demands where each demand is expressed in terms of
data type, sampling interval, duration, and quality, the aim
is to find a subset of demands that maximize the seller’s
revenue while satisfying the battery, quality and allocation
constraints. Figure 3 describes the EDSA sample scenario for
a seller with three devices offering three different data types
and four buyers with different data demands. All the demands
of buyer1, buyer2, and buyer3 are selected and assigned to
device1, device2, and device3, respectively, while only one
demand of buyer4 is selected and assigned to device3.
The EDSA problem is formulated as an Integer Linear
Program (ILP) as outlined below. Suppose a seller owns
D resource-constrained devices with battery levels Bi, for
i = 1, 2, . . . , D. Each device provides a set of data types
S. Without loss of generality, let Qij be the highest quality
threshold that a device i can meet for a data type j. There
are a total of C potential buyers, where each buyer may have
multiple demands with different data types requirements. The
unit data price Pij(qk) is defined on the basis of the device
i, data type j and the quality demand qk of the buyerk.
Nkj = (d
k
j /s
k
j ) is the total number of samples of data type
j demanded by buyerk, where dkj is the duration and s
k
j is
the sampling interval. We assume that energy consumption for
sensing varies for different sensors, while energy consumption
for processing and transmitting data is same for different data
types. The energy consumption Ekij of device i is the energy
required for sensing, processing, and transmitting data type j
to the buyerk as given in [23].
The following ILP formulation outputs a selection of de-
mands that optimally maximizes the total revenue while meet-
ing the battery, quality and allocation constraints. The objec-
tive function is the total revenue generated by the demands
selected and allocated to an IoT device of the seller. The EDSA
problem can be formulated as:
maximize
xkij∈{0,1}
D∑
i
S∑
j
C∑
k
xkijN
k
j Pij(q
k)
subject to
C∑
k
S∑
j
xkijE
k
ij ≤ Bi, ∀i, (1)
D∑
i
xkij ≤ 1, ∀k, ∀j, (2)
xkijq
k ≤ Qij , ∀i,∀j,∀k (3)
where the decision variables xkij = 1 if data typej demand
of buyerk is assigned to devicei, and xkij = 0 otherwise. Eq.
1 captures the battery constraint of the devices. The allocation
constraint in Eq. 2 ensures that each buyer demand is served
by at most one device of the seller. Eq. 3 represents the
quality constraint of the devices which defines the assignment
restrictions.
Decision making in the EDSA can be regarded as the
Multiple Knapsack Problem with Assignment Restrictions
(MKAR) [24]. MKAR is considered in [24] in which the profit
and weight of each item are the same. A more generic problem,
in which profits and weights are different, was studied by
[25]. It uses linear relaxation to find optimal vertex solutions
Fig. 3. EDSA sample scenario
followed by solving an instance of reduced MKAR problem
iteratively. MKAR is NP-hard in the strong sense and no
simple method to run on resource-constrained devices such as
dynamic programming is known to apply to the MKAR. Also,
given the low latency demand of a marketplace, computing
an optimal solution may not be ideal. Therefore, we use a
modified greedy heuristic approach [26] to include quality
constraints to solve the EDSA.
Algorithm: NR-based algorithm executed by the seller
1: Initialization of the Demand list.
2: for each dem in Demand
3: Calculate NR
4: end for
5: Sort demands in descending order of NR
6: if elements in NR are equal:
7: Sort demands in descending order of prices
8: end if
9: end sort
10: Sort devices in ascending order of battery availability
11: for each dem in Demand
12: for each dv in device
13: Compare Device battery ≥ demanded energy
14: Compare Device quality ≥ demand quality
15: Assign dem to dv
16: Update the available battery of dv
16: break
18: end for
19: end for
The intuition behind our algorithm is that selecting demands
with high prices and low energy consumption may result in
high total revenue for the seller under energy constraints.
Based on this intuition, we define the Normalized Revenue
(NR) of demand as the ratio of the generated revenue to the
energy consumption of the demand. If the prices are chosen
according to the costs, this scheme also maximizes the seller’s
total profit. Our NR-based algorithm starts by initializing the
list of demands (Line 1) and calculating the NR values for
each demand in the list (Line 2-4). Then, the list of demands
is sorted in descending order of NR values (Line 5-9). Note
that, demands with equal NR values are further sorted based
on their prices. The rest of the algorithm (Line 11-19) assigns
demands to devices using the sorted demands list (starting
from the demand with the highest NR value), checking the
battery availability and device quality constraints and updates
the available battery of the devices.
V. MARKETPLACE ELEMENTS
After identifying the desired list of buyers’ demands using
the NR-based algorithm, the seller sends the data offer directly
to the buyers. If both parties reach an agreement, a smart
contract encoded with terms of the agreement is compiled
into bytecode and deployed on the blockchain with a unique
address. Transactions or messages are used to invoke the smart
contract to update or modify its state. These transactions can
be either unisig or multisig. Unisig transactions require the
signature of either buyer or seller, whereas multisig trans-
actions require the signature of both buyer and seller. For
example, a transaction corresponding to the registration of the
subscription contract between buyer and seller is a multisig
transaction requiring the signature of both entities.
A smart contract can consist of several functions. So, the
application binary interface (ABI) is required to specify which
function in the contract to invoke along with the address of the
contract. Subscription details, participant’s ratings, and data
prices are recorded in the blockchain using data subscription,
rating, and pricing contracts, respectively. The ABIs and the
transaction details for different contracts are given below.
Data Subscription Contract (DSC) : The terms of agree-
ments are encoded in unisig DSC. Each seller-buyer pair
have a single DSC to provide flexibility and customization
based on their specifications. The DSC maintains the list
of subscriptions which includes subscription identifier, seller
identifier, buyer identifier, device identifier, data type, start
time, periodicity, duration, quality score (QS), privacy risk
score (RS), total cost, payment granularity, transaction status,
negotiation information. Device id is the hash of the device
MAC address to ensure the seller’s claim of owning the device
and the information is stored in hash form for the sake of
privacy. The DSC provides the following ABIs [10] to manage
the subscription list:
• subscriptionAdd(): This method adds a new subscription
request to the existing subscription list. The transaction Txadd
can only be issued by the seller. IDb is the buyer’s id and
Hashdata is the hash of the subscription details. Sigs and
PUs are the signature and public key of the seller respectively.
Txadd = [IDb|Hashdata|Sigs|PUs] (4)
• subscriptionInfo(): This ABI receives the subscription id and
returns the corresponding subscription details. The transaction
Txinfo can be initiated by either of the concerned parties
where SID is the subscription id, Sig and PU are the
signature and public key of either seller or buyer.
Txinfo = [SID|Sig|PU ] (5)
• subscriptionStart(): Subscription is started by the seller at
the subscription start time using Txstart.
Txstart = [SID|Sigs|PUs] (6)
• subscriptionSettlement(): This ABI is executed by Txsettle
where Dcount is a positive integer while F is a real number
in (0,1). Both seller and buyer are required to submit the data
count Dcount and provide feedback F to the other actor based
on his experience. This ABI performs settlement by comparing
the received data counts and taking the following action based
on both parties’ data counts. Case 1: If data counts from
both buyer and seller are equal, i.e., no conflicts exist, an
invoice is generated for the buyer and payment is released to
the seller. Case 2: Otherwise, in a dispute situation, the actor
with a higher reputation score, managed by a rating contract
explained later, is trusted.
Txsettle = [SID|Dcount|F |Sig|PU ] (7)
• subscriptionDelete(): On completion of the subscription,
Txdel is used to delete the subscription entry from the sub-
scription table.
Txdel = [SID|Sigs|PUs] (8)
Register Contract: This contract maintains a DSC look-up
table comprising of the following fields: contract id, creator
id, seller public key, buyer public key, DSC address, ABIs
name. The register contract uses the functions [10] discussed
below to manage the look-up table:
• contractCreate(): A newly deployed DSC can be added
to the contract lookup table using multisig Txcreate where
DSCaddress, DSCABI , and IDs are the DSC address, DSC
ABI , and the the seller ID, respectively.
Txcreate = [DSCaddress|DSCABI |IDs|Sigb|PUb|Sigs|PUs]
(9)
• contractRemove(): This ABI deletes the contract entry from
the lookup table. It subsequently performs the SelfDestruct
operation resulting in removal of the storage and code from
the state [30]. It is invoked by multisig Txremove where CID
is the contract ID.
Txremove = [CID|Sigb|PUb|Sigs|PUs] (10)
• contractGet(): Txget is issued by either of the parties to get
the DSC contract address and the associated ABIs.
Txget = [CID|Sig|PU ] (11)
Pricing Contract: A pricing contract maintains a ledger with
the following fields: timestamp, data type identifier, price,
quality score and privacy risk score. A message Mxprice is
issued to record the price of the traded data type whenever a
new DSC is deployed or a new subscription is added. IDtype
is the data type identifier, Hashdata is the hash of the price
details and Sigcontract is the signature of the issuing contract.
Mxprice = [IDtype|Hashdata|Sigcontract] (12)
We have adopted a competition-based pricing model in our
framework. This pricing strategy is suitable for highly compet-
itive markets, such as ours, which have a large population of
individual sellers interested in selling their IoT data in return
for incentives. In a competition-based pricing model, the seller
can follow the market going rate charged by other individuals
selling the same data type. This strategy does not require
any complex computation and dynamically varies based on
the market trend. The competitor’s price information Priceid,t
recorded in the ledger for ith transaction is used to calculate
the price index P id,t of data type d at a certain time t using
Eq. 13. QSid,t and RS
i
d,t are quality score and privacy risk
score respectively. Then, base price Pricedbase is calculated
by averaging P id,t for the number of transactions S in a given
time interval T using Eq. 14.
P id,t =
Priceid,t
QSid,t +RS
i
d,t + 1
(13)
Pricedbase =
∑S
i=1 P
i
d,t
S
, t ∈ T (14)
However, in a highly competitive scenario, price is not a
major differentiating factor to draw the buyers. Therefore,
the seller must provide value-added features as discussed in
section IIIB. We quantify these value-added features by the
Quality score (QS) and privacy risk score (RS). Quality
Score is the weighted average of the buyer’s demand for
quality levels and preferences. The privacy risk score of data
is calculated using the risk matrix technique proposed in [27].
The price of the data is proportional to the scores mentioned
above. Moreover, smart contract related execution fees (Pexe)
can also be divided between the seller and buyer as per the
negotiated terms. Our pricing model evaluates the price of a
particular data type d using Eq. 15 where β is the agreed-upon
share of Pexe.
Price = (1 +QS +RS)Pricedbase + βPexe (15)
Rating contract - In the marketplace, actors should be trust-
worthy as economic interests are relevant. Reputation plays a
crucial role in C2C (consumer to consumer) trading to build
trust, facilitate a smooth transaction and reduce risk [28].
The rating contract calculates the reputation score based on
the actor’s trading history in the marketplace. Post-settlement,
DSC issues a message Mxrate to update the trade history
between actor i and actor j. Feedback Fj and Fi are received
by actor j and actor i respectively. Tvalue is the transaction
value of the current trade. The rating contract records fol-
lowing fields in the ledger: maximum transaction value in the
trade history (vm), total positive feedback received (F+j ), total
feedback received, total number of failed contracts cfail due
to agreement violation, time of last request (ToLR) and the
total number of transactions Ti,j between actor i and actor j
in a very short span of time from ToLR.
Mxrate = [Tvalue|Fi|Fj |Sigcontract] (16)
Rating contract evaluates the reputation score RSj of an actor
j by updating his previous reputation score RS′j based on the
current feedback Fj and tuning factor α using Eq. 17. RSi is
the reputation score of actor i. The exponential factor is the
aging factor of the impact of contract violation. α is calculated
using Eq. 18 where FC is the Feedback Credibility (Eq. 19),
TV is the transaction value (Eq. 20) and CA is the collusive
activity (Eq. 21). a is a positive integer and used to contrast
possible collusive actor behaviors.
RSj = ((1− α)RS′j + αFj)e−
cfail
ctotal (17)
α = (FC + TV )CA (18)
FC =
Ri
Ri +Rj
.(
F+
F− + F+
) (19)
TV =
Tvalue
vm
(20)
CA = (
1
Ti,j
)a (21)
α tunes the latest received feedback based on the actors’
trading history and helps in mitigating malicious activity by a
dishonest actor in the marketplace, as explained below.
— Dishonest feedback: A dishonest actor with a low reputa-
tion score may malign other actor’s reputation score by giving
negative feedback. FC ensures that the feedback credibility
of such an actor is low.
— Ballot stuffing attack: An actor can exploit his high repu-
tation score by giving false negative feedback to other actors.
FC mitigates this activity by increasing feedback credibility
based on the number of negative feedback ratings given by
the actor.
— Strike and recharge attack: An actor may build up a good
reputation by executing several low-value transactions and
misbehaving in a very high-value interaction. TV prevents
this attack by slightly increasing the reputation score for
a low-valued transaction but considerably for a high-valued
transaction.
— Collusion: Two actors may collude with one another to
increase each other’s reputation score. With an increasing
number of transactions between two actors, CA tends to zero.
Consequently, feedback loses its relevance.
The above evaluation of the reputation score is suitable
for successful transactions only. We also consider the case
when the agreement is violated and not fulfilled. Agreement
violation should reduce the actor’s reputation score dras-
tically, hence discouraging the actor from performing any
such violations. To this end, we define a Violation Factor
Fig. 4. Autonomous data trading using smart contracts
(V F ) that solely depends on the actor’s ability to fulfill the
signed contract completely. It holds maximum weight in the
calculation of the actor’s reputation score as given in Eq. 22
where (Cfail) and (Ctotal) are the number of failed and total
contracts, respectively. The reputation score is calculated using
Eq. 23 as α and Fj are 0 during agreement violation.
V F = 2− 2(
Cfail
Ctotal
) (22)
RSj = RS
′
j .V F (23)
Figure 4 depicts how these contracts interact with each
other to automate the execution flow of the various stages
that are part of data trading. When a seller and a buyer reach
an agreement, a new DSC is compiled and deployed on the
blockchain. Seller issues Txadd to add subscription details
based on their negotiated terms. Seller notifies the buyer and
after verifying the terms in DSC, the buyer and seller both use
Txcreate to register the DSC. Subsequently, Mxprice updates
the price of the data. At the subscription start time, the seller
issues Txexecute to change the status of subscription to active
and it returns a session key to the buyer, which is used to
encrypt all data in transit to ensure data integrity. Then, data
is sent to the buyer and after verifying the data, sends an
acknowledgment to the seller. Both parties use a metering
system to count the transmission of N data samples to issue
Txsettle. Based on the count information, DSC verifies if there
is a conflict in the count. If there is no dispute, DSC issues an
invoice to the buyer and payment to the seller. If not, then the
dispute is lodged and payment is not processed. The entities
also send their feedback as an input to Txsettle. DSC issues
Mxrate to the rating contract, which uses respective feedback
to update the buyer and seller’s reputation scores.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
In this section, we first provide a proof-of-concept im-
plementation of the smart contracts, discussed in Section V,
using the Solidity version 0.5.12. Then, a single buyer and
seller were thoroughly tested on private Ethereum blockchain
Ganache. This ensures that the logical flow and execution
outcome from the interactions of different smart contracts
are as expected. Then we analyze the cost of trade on an
Ethereum public testnet. Next, we implement the NR-based
algorithm, presented in Section IV, in MATLAB to solve the
EDSA problem. The simulation results provide insights into
the seller’s revenue generation for different scenarios.
A. Proof of concept implementation
The implementation was done on the Ropsten testnet net-
work, the public Ethereum network, which behaves similarly
to a production blockchain. It runs a proof-of-work consensus
and used for testing purposes. Our smart contracts1 were
implemented and deployed using Remix IDE2.
It is worth noting that any operation or transaction that
modifies the state incurs fees, which need to be paid by the
involved parties. These costs are estimated using the amount of
gas consumed and the unit gas price. The gas consumed during
any operation reflects the computational complexity or size of
the smart contracts, while the miners in the system determine
the gas prices. We used 10 Gwei gas price to evaluate the cost
of different operations during data trading (the recommended
gas prices can be found at [29]). Table II shows the costs
of DSC contract deployment and the various transactions to
TABLE II
COST OF OPERATIONS IN ETHER AND USD.
Operations Gas used Cost Ethers Cost (USD)
DSC deployment 1212806 0.0121281 1.4675
Txcreate 86458 0.0008646 0.10462
Txadd 265792 0.0026579 0.32161
Txstart 43581 0.0004358 0.05273
Txsettle 579676 0.0057968 0.70141
Txdelete 22883 0.0002288 0.02768
1Smart contract codes available at https://github.com/pooja239/DataMart
2http://remix.ethereum.org/
TABLE III
EVALUATION PARAMETERS.
Parameter Value
Number of IoT devices (i) per seller D = 5
Data type (j) for each device S = 5
Price of jth type on ith device Pij ∼ N (10, 3)
Quality of jth type on ith device Qij ∼ U{10, 20, ..., 100}
Battery of ith device (mAh) Bi = 2000
Number of buyers (k) C = 10
Total number of demands dem = 50
Duration (hr) of kth buyer demand for jth type dkj ∼ N (5, 2)
Sampling interval (min) of kth buyer demand for jth type skj ∼ N (10, 60)
Quality demanded by kth buyer qk ∼ U{10, 20, ..., 100}
achieve end-to-end data trading, where the total cost of all the
operations sums up be USD 2.67555.
It can be observed that Txadd and Txsettle consumed more
gas than other transactions. This is because these transactions
involve write operations on the blockchain. Txadd requires
interaction with the pricing contract to fetch the price of the
subscription and also update the pricing information in the
ledger. At the same time, Txsettle interacts with the rating
contract to calculate and update the reputation score based on
the latest feedback. It can be observed that deploying a new
contract is expensive. Thus, a deployed trade contract could
be reused if it provides a satisfactory trading experience for
the users.
B. Evaluation
Table III gives the values of the parameters, defined in
section IV, used in the simulations unless stated otherwise.
The performance results are generated by averaging results
over 1000 iterations.
Figure 5 shows the effect of increasing the number of
demands requested for 10 data types by 50 buyers. We can
observe that increasing the number of demands requested from
10 to 250 causes a logarithmic growth for the revenue, which
reaches saturation at a certain demand level (210-230) due
to the limited batteries of the devices. This can be observed
from the residual battery levels. Note that buyers’ quality
Fig. 5. Revenue generation and demand selection with NR-based algorithm
requirements may also limit the number of demands served
by the seller, as some demands may have higher quality
requirements than the quality of data provided by the seller.
Next, Figure 6 demonstrates the effect of increasing the
battery capacity on the total revenue of a seller with a single
device. We observe that the revenue increases linearly with the
increasing battery capacity from 500mAh to 3000mAh. As the
battery capacity increases, the seller can select and serve more
demands and generates higher revenue. The residual battery
does not change much; however, the percentage of the residual
battery decreases, resulting in better battery capacity utility. It
is observed that with the linear increment of battery capacity,
the total revenue generated is increasing linearly.
Finally, we analyze the impact of increasing the number
of seller’s devices on the generated revenue in Figure 7. The
overall battery capacity with a seller is kept fixed to capture the
original trend of increasing the number of devices rather than
increasing battery which will linearly increase the generated
revenue. We observe that increasing battery capacity for IoT
devices is more strongly related to revenue generation than
increasing the number of devices. As we move from 10 devices
with 300mAh batteries to 1 device with 3000mAh battery,
the total revenue increases. This could be explained by the
smaller battery capacities and residual batteries remaining
on the devices. Devices with small batteries cannot serve
demands that require high energy consumption. Furthermore,
Fig. 6. Effect of increasing battery capacity
Fig. 7. Effect of increasing number of devices
the residual batteries remaining on the devices cannot be
combined and utilized to serve more demands.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have presented the design of a decentralized mar-
ketplace equipped with essential components such as data
agreement management, pricing model and rating mechanism.
We presented preliminary work showing how to implement
these components using smart contracts. Also, we evaluate
the gas consumption and cost incurred for interacting with
the proposed marketplace framework. Furthermore, we for-
mulated the EDSA problem that maximizes a user’s utility to
improve the sustainability and usability of the marketplace.
We simulated various scenarios to analyze the impact of the
requested demands on the battery drainage of the seller’s
devices. In our future work, we will consider maximizing the
number of demands selected in a multi-objective optimization
for demand selection and allocation problem. We will also
analyze the performance of the proposed real-time IoT data
marketplace and the NR-based algorithm experimentally using
IoT hardware.
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